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Abstract
Purpose: Dispatch Operations Safety Audit (DOSA) is a proactive and predictive method in safety
management system that detects the capabilities and pitfalls of  dispatcher performance. In this study,
Dispatch-Line Operations Safety Audit is carried out in an airline and results are analyzed and
discussed.
Design/methodology: The method of  DOSA implementation for flight operations officers is similar
to LOSA for flight crew.
Findings: Results show that DOSA has an important effect on Threat and Error Management (TEM)
in the Operations Control Center (OCC).
Originality/value: Potential applications of  this research include the better threat and error
management in OCC with the implementation of  DOSA as well as identification of  threats and errors
types for FOOs in OCC. Also, distribution of  threats and errors in different phases of  dispatch shift is
discussed, therefore syllabuses of  training courses can be provided with respect to threat and error
types for flight operations officers.
Keywords: Safety Management System (SMS); Human error analysis; Analysis of  safety data; Safety
audit; Dispatch-LOSA.
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1. Introduction
Currently, the safety management system is a necessary system for the aviation industry. Regarding
hazard identification, three methods are identified to capture safety data: Reactive, Proactive and
Predictive methods. The three methods depend on seriousness of  the consequences of  the triggering
event. The reactive method concerns with the past events. The proactive method involves actively
seeking hazards in the existing processes, and the predictive method deals with gathering data and
actively seeking hazards in the future (ICAO, 2013). 
Identifying active failures and latent conditions is a critical aspect for any organization involved in high-
risk operations. The active failures and latent conditions are related to errors and threats, respectively
(Thomas, 2004). Threat and Error Management (TEM) is a method to determine the high-risk hazards.
Threats are out-of-control external conditions for Flight Operations Officers (FOOs) which must to be
managed. They are categorized into two types: environmental threats and airline threats, each of  which
can be either expected or unexpected. They have the potential to compromise safety. The expected
threats include adverse weather or aircraft malfunctions, which can be anticipated by the FOOs. The
unexpected threats include for instance the crew scheduling errors. In this situation, there is no warning
for the FOOs in advance. The environmental threats are related to outside of  the airline, such as errors
of  ATC, SITA flight planning and etc. The airline threats are attributed to the airline personnel or
conditions as well as airline and aircraft events such as aircraft Limitation / MEL, cabin crew,
maintenance errors and etc. 
Errors are FOO actions or inactions which lead to deviations from their organizational intentions or
expectations (Klinect, 2005). The errors of  FOO are categorized in two types: technical errors and
non-technical errors. The technical errors are caused by ignorance or violation of  regulations and
documentations while the non-technical errors consist of  communication, morality or Crew Resource
Management (CRM) errors. Furthermore, sources of  errors are three types: spontaneous, related
threats and error chain leading to additional errors. Most errors are managed routinely while some may
provoke new error or Undesired Flight Dispatch State (UFDS) (Helmreich, Klinect & Wilhelm, 1999). 
UFDS is a FOO error-induced aircraft state that clearly reduces the existing safety margin. UFDSs are
two types: deviation of  flight implementation and incorrect data or information. Their only source is
undetected or mismanaged FOO errors (Klinect, 2005). 
In order to identify threats and errors to decrease the occurrence of  accidents and incidents and keep
them at an acceptable level of  safety, the safety system needs to shift from a reactive mode to proactive
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and predictive ones. The annual proficiency check is a proactive method in the Operations Control
Center (OCC) which is punishable for the FOOs. 
The interest in research to improve performance of  personnel in OCCs has increased rapidly over the
last decade. The effect of  different decision making processes by controllers was applied in six airline
OCCs in the paper by Bruce (2011). Bouarfa et.al studied the different coordination policies between
OCC and other sections of  airline (Bouarfa, Blom & Curran, 2016). 
The Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) is a proactive and predictive method for data collection in
normal flight operations which improves the flight crew performance (ICAO, 2005). Its methodology is
indorsed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for monitoring flight crew
performance. It provides a tool for collecting data; the acquired data is not the final step; the
organization must analyze the data and discover problems in order to react in the best manner to
improve safety. DOSA is the adaptation method of  LOSA to improve FOO performance.  
LOSA began in 1991 as a human factor research project in the University of  Texas at Austin (ICAO,
2002). In the next decade, its utilization became wide spread in many regional and international airlines
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2009; Klinect, Murray, Merritt & Helmreich, 2003; Klinect,
Willhelm & Helmreich, 1999; Murray, 2005; Merritt & Klinect, 2006). 
In 2007, LOSA application to single pilot operations (LOSA: SP) was accomplished in New Zealand to
decrease the incident and accident rate (Earl, Peregonzalez & Frey, 2007). The Guild of  Air Pilots and
Air Navigators (GAPAN) conducted a series of  TEM courses in Australia in 2008/9 for pilots involved
in low capacity public transport and single-pilot operations (Earl, Murray & Bates, 2011). 
The LOSA was developed in other areas with equally positive results such as Air Traffic Control
(Normal Operations Safety Survey (NOSS)) (Henry, 2007), the military (Mission Operations Safety
Audits) (Burdekin, 2003), the Queensland Rail (Confidential Observations of  Rail Safety-CORS)
(McDonald, Garrigan & Kanse, 2006), apron (ramp) and maintenance operations (Ma & Rankin, 2012)
which were all completed successfully. 
In 2005, Continental Airlines implemented the first DOSA by three dispatcher observers. The results
of  DOSA look really promising, although they are not published in detail (Flight Safety Foundation
Editorial Staff, 2008). 
In 2009, the first LOSA was begun in Iran Air. From 2009 to 2015, three LOSAs were implemented in
Iran Air for flight crew monitoring. LOSAs were undertaken on all fleets including short and medium
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hauls as well as domestic and international routes for all fleets. Results were  published by Khoshkhoo,
Goodarzi and Sharafbafi (2011, 2013). 
Regarding the successful results of  the three LOSAs, the Flight Safety Department in Iran Air decided
to launch the first DOSA in 2015. In this study, the results of  the first DOSA in Iran Air are analyzed
and discussed. 
 2. DOSA Implementation Method 
In this DOSA, the steering committee was held by safety FOOs of  the OCC and some of  the Flight
Safety Department experts. The committee identified program goals. The main goal was to decrease
the number of  technical and non-technical errors. Factors such as incorrect paperwork, briefing and
radio communication were defined as technical errors and FOO-FOO communications, FOO-external
sources communications and FOO-flight crew communications were defined as non-technical errors.
All types of  errors are surveyed in this paper. 
The first significant step in implementing DOSA was cultural activities which have been achieved
through massive advertising such as issuing banners, posters, bulletins and memos about DOSA to
inform all FOO in OCC and associated departments.   
 The DOSA bulletin consisting its summary and process was located at the dispatch briefing center two
months prior to the project. The other task was issuing a managing commitment which explains the
overall purpose of  DOSA for FOOs and the fact that all observations own non-punitive nature. The
documents were prepared one month before and signed by the Director of  operations control center.
The methodology of  DOSA was similar to LOSA. The observers were selected and trained about the
targets and their tasks. 
The DOSA observation form was designed according to activities and hazards of  FOOs. The patterns
of  threat, errors and undesired flight dispatch states are identified by the DOSA steering committee.
The format of  observation form was based on modification of  the LOSA form in the advisory
Circular (Federal Aviation administration, 2006). Threats, errors and UDFSs was relating to all sections
of  the OCC. 
The DOSA process was implemented in Iran Air based on ten operating characteristics (Klinect et al.,
2003). The total number of  FOO personnel’s in the OCC was 28. Overall DOSA observations were 36.
The dispatch observation length range was between 10 to 12 hrs. 
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DOSA implementation was based on Advisory Circular (Federal Aviation administration, 2006) and
Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) documents (ICAO, 2002). The observed data was collected
during two months. Then after, the data processing phase (second phase) was begun by the DOSA
steering committee. They checked and then used them as input in the related data software for
analyzing. In the third step called feedback phase, the DOSA steering committee studied the goals for
improvement. Finally, all results, conclusions and goals were published as a report and sent to all
relative functional managers and training directors. Besides, we published our findings in the flight
safety magazine for FOOs. 
3. Results
In the following section, DOSA threats and errors are presented. Results are divided in two sections; in
the first section, external threats are shown and in the second section, FOOs errors are surveyed and
analyzed. 
3.1 External threat results from DOSA 
In the following section, results of  external threats of  DOSA are presented. The DOSA data in Table 1
shows that the number of  threats can vary between dispatch shifts. Over 88% of  dispatch shift
contained at least one external threat. The average and maximum numbers of  external threats were 2.22
and 4 per dispatch shift, respectively.
Total External Threats 80
Percentage of  Dispatch Shift at Least One External Threat 88.89%
Average External Threats per Dispatch Shift 2.22
Most External Threats in one Dispatch Shift 4
 Table 1. General external threat results
Data in Table 2 exhibits the distribution of  threat types. It is obviously visible that the most occurring
external threats were airline threat including building / workspaces followed by airline operational
pressure and ground maintenance. Over 70 percent of  threats were managed by FOOs. The
operational pressure of  FOOs could lead to their error.
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Threat Type Percentage of  Threats of  DOSA
Enviromental Threat CAO (Regulations, NOTAM, …) 5.00 % 5%
Airline Threats
Buildings / Workspaces 40.00 %
95.00 %Airline Operational Pressure 30.00 %
Most External Threats in one Dispatch Shift 10.00 %
Others 15.00 %
 Table 2. Distribution of  external threat types
The DOSA data in Table 3 shows the percentage of  external threats in each phase of  dispatch shift.
The highest percentage of  external threats occurred in the general action phase followed by pre-flight
phase. This table shows that about 55% of  all threats took place during the general action and 25%
during the pre-flight phase. General action was defined as a condition which is not related to flight
issue.
Phase of  dispatch shift Percentage of  External Threats of  DOSA
Pre-Flight During Flight 25.00 %
During Flight 15.00 %
Termination of  Flight 5.00 %
General Action Pre-Flight 55.00 %
 Table 3. External threats by phase of  dispatch shift
3.2. Error results from DOSA
The data in Table 4 shows the total number of  FOO errors in DOSA. Over 88 percent of  dispatch
shifts in the database included errors. In some cases, the number of  FOO errors increased to 16 errors
per dispatch shift. The average number of  errors was 4.22 / dispatch shift.
Total Errors 152
Percentage of  Dispatch Shift at Least One Error 88.89 %
Average number of  Errors per Dispatch Shift 4.22
Most number of  Errors in a Dispatch Shift 16
 Table 4. General result of  FOO errors
Table 5 shows the distribution of  error types in DOSA. The distribution of  error types can change
from a shift to the other. It is clearly shown that most technical errors with prevalence of  at least one
error per shift were related to lack of  radio communication followed by lack of  flight monitoring, lack
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of  shift change briefing and insufficient analysis of  NOTAM, respectively. The most frequent type of
non-technical error was FOO-FOO communication which seems to be related to the high work load
pressure of  the dispatch personnel. 
Error Type Percentage of  Dispatch Shift at LeastOne Error in DOSA
Technical error
Lack of  Radio Communication 44.44 %
Lack of  Flight Monitoring 33.33 %
Lack of  Shift Change Briefing 33.33 %
Insufficient Analysis of  NOTAM 22.22 %
Insufficient Briefing to Crew Others 22.22 %
Non-technical error
FOO to FOO Communication 22.22 %
FOO to Crew Communication 11.11 %
FOO to External Communication (Other
Personnel/ Departments) 11.11 %
 Table 5. Distribution of  error types regarding DOSA
Table 6 shows the percentage of  each FOO error types. Results reveal that most error types are
technical errors. The most repetitive technical error included lack of  radio communication followed by
lack of  flight monitoring, lack of  shift change briefing and insufficient analysis of  NOTAM,
respectively. The most frequent type of  non-technical error is related to FOO-flight crew
communication preceded by FOO-FOO communication, respectively. It seems that non-technical
errors can decrease with training CRM for the FOOs and changes in the syllabus of  their according to
the results.
Error Type Percentage of  Dispatch Shift at Least OneError in DOSA
Technical error
Lack of  Radio Communication 18.42 %
81.58 %
Lack of  Flight Monitoring 15.79 %
Lack of  Shift Change Briefing 13.16 %
Insufficient Analysis of  NOTAM 7.89 %
Others 26.32 %
Non-technical error
FOO - FOO Communication 5.26 %
18.42 %FOO - Crew Communication 10.53 %
FOO - External Communication (Other Personnel/
Departments) 2.63 %
 Table 6. Percentage of  error types of  FOOs
Table 7 exhibits the distribution of  FOO errors in each phase of  dispatch shift. It is obvious that the
pre-flight phase and then the during flight phase have the most errors in dispatch, respectively. About
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47 percent of  all observed errors occurred during the pre-flight phase while approximately 26 percent
happened in the during flight phase. 
Phase of  dispatch shift Percentage of  Errors of  DOSA
Pre-Flight 47.37 %
During Flight 26.32 %
Termination of  Flight 10.53 %
General Action 15.78 %
 Table 7. Distribution of  FOO errors by phase of  dispatch shift
Data in Table 8 shows the distribution of  managed and mismanaged errors. Over 52 % of  the errors
are managed by FOOs. Only 22 percent of  errors were consequential and linked to additional error or
UFDS.
Error Management Percentage of  Errors of  DOSA
Managed 52.63 %
Mismanaged 47.37 %
 Table 8. Distribution of  managed and mismanaged errors by FOOs
4. Conclusions 
In this study, the results of  DOSA in Iran Air airline are surveyed. Recent investigation shows that
DOSA similar to LOSA can detect the capabilities and pitfalls of  the operational performance for
dispatch. Also results show that it is a successful way to identify and detect threats and errors in normal
dispatch operations. DOSA will provide a proactive and predictive safety system in OCC and it reveals
the potential to increase the safety margin. 
The results exhibited that the major portion of  external threats were the airline threats (more than 95
percent). The airline operational pressure of  FOOs could lead to FOO errors. The highest percentage
of  external threats occurred in the general action phase followed by in the pre-flight phase, respectively.
Results showed that most error types were technical error. The most repetitive technical error included
lack of  radio communication followed by lack of  flight monitoring, lack of  shift change briefing and
insufficient analysis of  NOTAM, respectively. The pre-flight phase and then the during flight phase
comprise the most number of  errors in dispatch, respectively. 
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